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This paper evaluates whether or not simplicity or "minimalistic" heuristics, which are posited
to account for local ambiguity resolution at the level of structural processing and for the lack
of inferential elaboration during discourse processing, represent the most accurate account of
language processing. Evidence from on-line studies is presented which suggests that alterna-
tive, more knowledge-based mechanisms for handling processing are brought to bear in these
situations.
Perhaps the best-known (and certainly most ubiquitous) characteristic of
language that needs to be confronted by language processing models is
ambiguity. Ambiguity (and the decisional uncertainty that accompanies
it) exists at every putative level, of language processing-phonological,
lexical, structural, interpretative. Importantly, formal representations of
language (such as linguistic theories of grammar) are neither intended to,
nor devised in such a way as to allow for, either consideration or
resolution of uncertainty over the ambiguity encountered by a proces-
sor-rather, such resolution is an issue left solely, to processing models.
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One of the most common approaches found in processing models
that attempt to deal with situations of ambiguity or uncertainty is to posit
"psychologically based" heuristics motivated by notions of computa-
tional simplicity or "minimal effort." Generally, any particular simplic-
ity heuristic is, posited to account for the resolution of uncertainty at only
a particular source or level of processing, guiding the listener/reader to an
initial interpretation free of uncertainty. For example, Fodor, Frazier, and
their associates (e.g., Frazier, 1978; Frazier & Fodor, 1978) have
claimed that readers make use of a "minimal attachment" heuristic when
confronted with local syntactic ambiguities. In this, the simplest analysis
(as determined by the number and depth of phrase structure nodes) is
initially computed, followed by backtracking and reanalysis only when
this simplicity heuristic turns out to be inappropriate.
Similar heuristics based on principles of minimal effort or simplicity
have been proposed by a number of researchers to operate at various other
levels of processing-lexical access, coreference assignment, inferential
processing, and the like. These heuristics have appeal on a number of
grounds, the most obvious being that arguments in science are deemed
relatively more valuable, ceteris paribus, if they account for evidence on
the basis of simple, rather than more complex, principles. In addition,
simplicity is a metric which has presumed general application, and hence
is often viewed as a logical candidate for guiding cognitive/psychological
processing in general.
Despite the value of such heuristics, however, it seems that they are
often the choice of last resort; that is, failure to find evidence support-
ing knowledge-based ambiguity or uncertainty resolution processes
often seems to leave arguments appealing to simplicity or minimalism
as the only defensible alternative. And, indeed, in a field in as much
flux as language processing, simplicity arguments are hard to argue
against, particularly when simplicity can be defined in terms of so
many as yet empirically untested principles. It is for this reason that it
seems worthwhile to constantly test predictions stemming from such
heuristics, on the off chance that more sensitive tests or new experimental
conditions may add to our knowledge of the bounds between such
general-processing principles as compared with more knowledge-based
processes operating during language comprehension and production. In
what follows, we present on-line evidence concerning two areas of
language processing in which simplicity or minimalistic hypotheses
have held considerable influence-structural assignment and inferential
elaboration-and we argue that alternative mechanisms must be consid-
ered.The Simplicity Heuristic and On-Line Processing
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ASSIGNMENT OF GRAMMATICAL ROLES AND
COMPUTATION OF CONSTITUENT STRUCTURE
Local structural ambiguities, in which the proper grammatical role
of a given word or phrase is temporarily uncertain, are ubiquitous in
natural languages. For example, the italicized NP in (1) might be the
object of the verb, as in continuation (a), or the subject of an upcoming
sentential complement, as in continuation (b):
(1) The lawyer believed the defendant ...
(a) and took the case.
(b) was lying.
Considerable evidence from eye movement studies (gaze durations
and regressions) has been interpreted to indicate that readers rapidly
assign a single grammatical role to each word and phrase as it is
encountered, even when faced with uncertainty as to the correct gram-
matical assignments (i.e., a serial account of dealing with structural
ambiguity in parsing) (see, e.g., Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Rayner,
Carlson, & Frazier, 1983; Ferreira & Clifton, 1985). Because it is argued
that only a single structure is computed at a time, it is necessary for a
processing model to provide principles accounting for precisely which
one of the several possible analyses is initially pursued. Frazier and her
associates (Frazier, 1978; Frazier & Fodor, 1978) proposed the "minimal
attachment" heuristic to this end, in which the simplest structure (as
defined by the number of nodes in the phrase/tree structure) is attempted
first, followed by backtracking and reanalysis if this structure turns out to
be incorrect.
The appeal of the minimal attachment heuristic lies in its appeal to
simplicity and in the claim that it is applied in all (or most) cases of
syntactic uncertainty. However, even assuming that a serial model is the
correct one, other possible heuristics are conceivable. For example,
Clifton, Frazier, and Connine (1984) provide evidence of the influence of
verb subcategorization frame and/or argument structure biases during
sentence comprehension. Such biases could be used to resolve certain
types of syntactic uncertainty; the "preferred" frame or argument
structure (perhaps as determined by frequency of usage) might be
attempted first (see also Tanenhaus, Boland, Garnsey, & Carlson, 1989,
for evidence to this effect). Therefore, as a number of authors have noted,
it is critically important to determine whether or not the minimal
attachment analysis of an ambiguous string is initially computed even556
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when other reasonable heuristics (suggesting a nonminimal analysis)
could be employed.
We have investigated this question by recording event-related
potentials (ERPs) elicited during the comprehension of sentences con-
taining syntactic ambiguities. The value of this approach lies in the fact
that ERPs are an on-line reflection of processing activity that do not
require simultaneous performance of some decision task during language
comprehension (as is the case with monitoring tasks, continuous reading,
syntactic decision tasks, etc.). In particular, the use of ERPs to examine
structural processing is justified by recent work demonstrating that certain
syntactic anomalies (e.g., violations of subcategorizational constraints)
elicit a positive-going ERP component with an onset about 500 millisec-
onds following the violation (Osterhout, 1989; Osterhout & Holcomb,
1989). Thus, there appears to be an ERP component sensitive to the
processing of syntactic variables. We have employed it to examine the
question of how the processing device deals with temporary structural
ambiguity as a function of the presence or absence of verb information
that might help resolve the issue. In this study subjects were presented
(visually) with sentences of the following type:
(1) The lawyer hoped the defendant was lying.
(pure intransitive)
	
(2) *The lawyer forced the defendant was lying.
(pure transitive)
(3) The lawyer knew the defendant was lying.
(biased intransitive)
(4) The lawyer believed the defendant was lying.
(biased transitive)
In these sentences, transitivity properties associated with the main verb
have been manipulated. The question of interest concerns how readers
assign grammatical roles to the underlined NP in the presence of this
verb-based information about the structure of the underlined NP; basi-
cally, the issue concerns whether the processor will use such information
on line to reduce processing uncertainty, whether it will rely on the
"simplicity metric" (minimal attachment), or whether some other
(nonserial) process will be demonstrated. The intransitive verb in (1)
indicates that the NP will not be a simple object and should be treated as
the subject of the upcoming complement (V-S' analysis). The transitive
verb in (2) indicates the appropriate structure to be NP-as-object-of-verb
(V-NP analysis); note that under this analysis the subsequent materialThe Simplicity Heuristic and On-Line Processing
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("was lying") renders the sentence ungrammatical. The main verbs in (3)
and (4) can occur with or without a direct object NP, rendering the correct
grammatical role of the postverbal NP temporarily uncertain. However,
the verb in (3) is one that is statistically biased toward appearing as an
intransitive verb and that in (4) is biased toward appearing as a transitive
verb.
The crucial comparisons concern decisions made during comprehen-
sion of sentences like (3) and (4). According to strict versions of the
minimal attachment hypothesis, readers should initially construct the
(incorrect) V-NP analysis for sentences like (3) and (4) (and, of course,
(2)). Given prior findings of a positive ERP component associated with
syntactic anomaly, if these incorrect transitive interpretations are as-
signed, one would expect this positive ERP component to be elicited
when the subject encounters the word was in sentences of type (2), (3),
and (4). In contrast, if verb subcategory biases determine the initial
assignment of grammatical roles, only sentence types (2) and (4) should
elicit the syntactic anomaly ERP component; sentences like (3) should
not, since the verb bias is consistent with the correct V-S' analysis.
Sentences were presented visually in a word-by-word manner, with
each word appearing by itself for 300 ms on a CRT screen and with a
350-ms blank screen separating words. Figure 1 shows wave forms
observed at site Pz following presentation of the (double underlined)
word was in each sentence type, averaged across 30 exemplars per
condition and 12 subjects. Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that ungram-
matical sentences like (2) elicited a late positive component relative to the
other sentence types with an onset about 500 ms poststimulus and with a
duration of about 300 ms   (F(1, 11) > 10, p < .05  in  all  comparisons)
Additionally, sentences containing transitively biased verbs also appeared
to elicit a positive component relative both to sentences containing pure
intransitive   (F(1, 11) = 7.46, p < . 05)   and  to  sentences containing
intransitively biased verbs (F(l, 11) = 10.16, p < .05). No significant
differences in the ERPs elicited by the pure intransitive and biased
intransitive sentences were observed.
Thus, an ERP component associated with syntactic anomaly was
elicited following transitively biased verbs but not following intransi-
tively biased verbs in intransitive structures. This observation is most
consistent with the claim that readers initially computed a single structure
(the serial hypothesis) for sentences like (3) and (4), and that information
about verb transitivity preferences determined which analysis was ini-
tially pursued. Importantly, these data are clearly not consistent with
claims that the language processor relies on a strict minimal attachment558
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heuristic -- the simplicity heuristic -- to resolve cases of local syntactic
ambiguity.
INFERENCE GENERATION DURING
DISCOURSE PROCESSING
Language comprehension viewed at the level of discourse poses a
slightly different type of uncertainty to the comprehension device. One of
the hallmarks of the construction of a discourse representation during
comprehension is that much information is left implicit in a discourse; the
listener/reader is expected to make the proper inferences concerning
necessary, presupposed, and relevant information not explicitly men-
tioned in the discourse. However, it is clear that not all potential
inferences can be; made, since even the shortest discourse can license an
essentially unbounded number of inferences. Hence, the listener/reader
   Pure Intransitive	 Pure Transitive
     Biased Intransitive
	
Biased Transitive
Fig. 1. Mean electrical activity recorded over site Pz during presentation of auxiliary verb in
each of four sentence types.must decide which inferences among the plethora of possible inferences
should be generated. In this sense, discourse-based inference generation,
like the other processes mentioned above, requires the resolution of
uncertainty: What information should be added to the discourse repre-
sentation? What types of inferences are made, and, under what condi-
tions?
Several authors have argued, in what has come to be the standard
position in this field, that comprehenders rely on a "minimal inference"
heuristic during the construction of discourse representations (Corbett &
Dosher, 1978; Dosher & Corbett, 1982; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986).
Listeners/readers are argued to generate only those inferences that are
minimally necessary for discourse coherence (e.g., inferences concerning
causal or coreferential relations between discourse elements). Inferences
that are elaborative rather than necessary for logical coherence (e.g.,
inferences concerning such things as implied instruments or predictable
consequences) are argued not to be generated under the strong version of
this hypothesis.
We have recently investigated this general claim of minimal infer-
ence generation in an experiment designed to investigate the role of
scripted information and contextual cues on the generation of one type of
"elaborative" inference-that involving use of an implied instrument
(Osterhout & Swinney, 1989). In this study, subjects were presented
auditorily with short two-sentence paragraphs such as the one displayed
in Table I. Two versions of the first of the two sentences were constructed
for each paragraph. One version presented a standard, scripted scenario
(e.g., eating a meal), while the second version provided a neutral context
omitting the scripted scenario. The second sentence of the short para-
graph always implied the use of an instrument often found in the
The Simplicity Heuristic and On-Line Processing
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Table I. Sample Paragraph and Targets of the Type Used in Inference Experimenta,b
First sentence
Script-suggestive context:
	
"John sat down to a meal of meat and potatoes."
Neutral context:
	
"John sat down at his usual place at the table."
Second (implied use) sentence
	
* He cut the juicy meat * and ate his bread.
Visual targets
	
Knife
	
(Instrumental-related target)
Frame
	
(Control target)
aSource: Osterhout and Swinney (1989).
bAn asterisk marks the approximate locations at which target letter strings were visually
presented.suggested scenario. Inference generation was measured by a cross-modal
priming task in which experimental (instrument-related) and control
visual targets (to which subjects made lexical decisions) were presented
at two points during paragraph presentation (to different subjects in
different conditions): immediately after the context sentence (before the
second sentence), and immediately after the end of the verb phrase
implying use of the instrument. The premise behind use of this technique
is  that, if the implied instrument is activated during the ongoing
(perceptual) processing of the discourse, it will cause priming (facilita-
tion) for the lexical decision to the instrument-related target as compared
with the control target at that point at which the inference is elaborated-
if ever (see, e.g., Swinney, 1981, for description of the task).
Table II displays mean priming scores (response times to control
words minus response times to experimental instrument-related target
words) for each of the two probe points. As can be seen, no priming of
instrument targets was found immediately after script-suggestive context,
nor was any found immediately after the neutral context. Additionally, no
priming was found following the verb phrase implying use of the
instrument in the neutral context condition. However, in the condition
involving both the script-suggestive context and the subsequent verb
phrase implying use of the instrument, significant priming of the
instrument target was produced, suggesting that elaboration of the
instrumental inference took place at this point.
These data support our argument that, contrary to the minimal
elaboration hypothesis, certain types of "elaborative" inferences are in
fact reliably made under certain conditions. Note that the conditions
under which this inferential elaboration was produced are those involving
a confluence of knowledge-based information; each type of context alone
did not produce the effect (and hence, appeals to simple associativity
controlling this elaboration appear ruled out). While the precise mecha-
560
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Table II. Mean Priming Latencies (Control Target RTs,
minus Instrument Targets RTs in MS) at Each of the
Two Test Points
Target test point
Context type 1 2
Script-suggestive 9 47 a
Neutral
	
4
	
19
ap < .05.The Simplicity Heuristic and On-Line Processing
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nism controlling elaboration of such inferences remains to be determined,
the critical issue here is that the minimalist argument does not appear to
stand up under close scrutiny.
SUMMARY
This paper has briefly reviewed two new pieces of evidence
concerning the resolution of uncertainty and ambiguity during language
comprehension. This evidence has disconfirmed predictions from two
standard models of structural and discourse processing that rely on
notions of computational or psychological simplicity (minimalism) as
explanatory mechanisms. When confronted with local syntactic ambigu-
ities, readers initially chose the path suggested by verb subcategory
biases, rather than the structurally simpler path predicted by the minimal
attachment heuristic. Additionally, listeners demonstrated generation of
"elaborative" inferences under certain contextual conditions, a finding
not in keeping with a "minimal inference" heuristic for discourse
analysis. In addition to the obvious claims about the specific mechanisms
involved in structural and discourse processing, we take the evidence
presented here to argue for caution in reliance on pervasive general
"psychologically relevant" heuristics such as simplicity in processing
models. The intrinsic appeal of simplicity may, as it appears to have done
in the cases cited here, act to mask the fact that its explanatory power may
be almost impossible to evaluate given the ever-changing nature of the
theoretical representational base on which it is applied, particularly in
areas of language and linguistics. It should remain a heuristic of last
resort only.
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